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ABSTRACT: Immigration has become a key issue in electoral competition in Italy. Several studies have demonstrated 
the weight of immigration on voting choices of Italian voters, as well as the importance that this issue has had for the 
electoral success of certain parties, namely the League. However, it is still unclear why voters are mobilized on this 
issue and, more generally, what are the underlying factors of individual attitudes towards migrants. In this paper we 
explore whether and to what extent these attitudes are the result of latent cultural factors, which find their roots in 
long-standing and deeper value predispositions. We do so, relying on an original survey carried out among Italian 
citizens and making use of the Schwartz conceptualization and measurement of values. A series of regression analyses 
demonstrate that, besides conditions of objective economic deprivation, proximity to migrants, and perception of threat 
and insecurity, values are the most relevant explanatory factors of attitudes towards immigration. This leads us to 
conclude that hostile attitudes towards immigration are not the result of a radical transformation of public opinion in 
Italy, but rather the expression of more general, structurally conservative value orientations.  
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Immigration is certainly one of the issues that have sparked the electoral campaign for the Italian general 
election of March 2018 and which still has a relevant place in the Italian political agenda (Valbruzzi 2019; 
Roncarolo and Cremonesi 2019). Several analyses have widely demonstrated the weight of immigration on 
voting choices of Italians, as well as the importance that this issue has had (and continues to have) for the 
electoral success of political parties such as the League (De Sio and Paparo 2018). Specifically, by adopting a 
hard line on the management of migration flows and implementing restrictive policies on immigration, the 
party led by Matteo Salvini was able to mobilize the Italian electorate, which was already largely critical of 
the phenomenon: according to some recent data (De Sio, Emanuele, Maggini, Paparo, Angelucci and D’Ali-
monte 2019), about 80% of respondents believe that the number of migrants in Italy is too high, where only 
20% believe that Italy can still welcome more migrants. 
But what is at the root of the attitudes of Italians towards immigration? What makes a significant portion of 
the Italian electorate hostile towards migration flows (Emanuele, Maggini, and Paparo 2019)? These are the 
main research questions that we investigate in this paper.  
Of course, there is no lack of studies addressing the reasons behind negative attitudes towards migration. 
Scholars have regularly shown, for example, that attitudes towards migration are associated with objective 
conditions of economic insecurity and deprivation; others, instead, maintain that critical positions towards 
immigration should be attributed to the (real or perceived) presence of migrants in their neighbourhoods and 
to the security threat (real or perceived) that they represent. However, in this paper we adopt a perspective that 
has been only rarely applied to the specific case of Italy (for an exception see Catellani and Milesi 2010). This 
approach links attitudes towards immigration to value predispositions of Italian citizens. On this basis we 
advance here the argument that attitudes towards migrants are the result of latent cultural factors (which cer-
tainly were not born in recent months), rather than short-term factors. 
The implications of using this approach are not trivial. One thing, in fact, is to discover that the Salvini 
League's mobilization capacity has relied on a new restlessness due to the migration crisis; another thing would 
be to find out that in reality he brought to light profound attitudes that had been in the past also at the basis of 
the consent to the centre-right led by Berlusconi. In short: have Italians, inspired by Salvini, suddenly became 
all intolerant (as we read frequently in the media), or - substantially - a part of them has always been hostile to 
immigration? In this sense it should be remembered that the Bossi-Fini1 law was introduced by the centre-right 
led by Berlusconi; and it was still within that coalition that Roberto Calderoli (at the time vice-president of the 
Senate) compared the minister Kyenge to an orangutan (Hogarth 2016). In this perspective, the restrictive 
attitude expressed by Salvini could be in fact perhaps more in continuity with the identity of the centre-right 
coalition than frequently perceived. However, it is worth exploring this issue based on public opinion data. 
Are critical positions towards immigration the result of individual predispositions rooted in an important part 
of Italian society? 
A recent contribution investigating exactly the link between immigration attitudes and the success of Sal-
vini’s League in the 2018 Italian general election has shown that indeed Italians are no more anti-immigrants 
 
1 Law No. 189 of 30 July 2002 on immigration is best known as 'Bossi-Fini' after of its signatories (Colombo, Sciortino, and 
Craveri 2002), respectively the then secretary of the Northern League (Umberto Bossi) and the secretary of the National Alliance 
(Gianfranco Fini). Although the law has been understood in very different ways by different scholars (see e.g. Pugliese 2006; 
Einaudi 2007), the Bossi-Fini law is often considered as indictive of the anti-immigration rhetoric (and legislation) during the 
center-right government led by Silvio Berlusconi between 2001 and 2006 (Geddes 2008). 





than they were a few years back (Vezzoni 2018). Then, the increased relevance of immigration issues on voting 
behaviour lied in the increase of the saliency they had in voters’ minds, which Salvini’s electoral campaign 
was able to produce. Thus, Salvini was able to advance electorally as a consequence of his ability to match, 
voice, and legitimate voters’ pre-existing anti-immigration attitudes in such context in which they became 
more prominent. 
In this paper, we start from Vezzoni’s findings, which seem to indicate the prevalence of long-term deter-
minants of (stable) anti-immigrant attitudes of Italian voters, and we develop a comprehensive account of the 
factors behind anti-immigrant attitudes, comparing and contrasting the relevance of long-term value predispo-
sitions with the (actual or perceived) presence of migrants and of related phenomena.  
We do so by employing an original survey dataset collected by the Centro Italiano di Studi Elettorali (Italian 
Centre for Electoral Studies, CISE) through Demetra in December 2018, which features multiple items inves-
tigating respondents’ value orientations, insecurity, and interactions with immigrants. 
In our empirical analysis, we show that both economic insecurity and socio-demographics matter only to a 
marginal extent in accounting for anti-immigrant attitudes. Furthermore, proximity to migrants and perception 
of physical threat have significant roles in explaining attitudes towards immigration, but they still provide a 
limited account of individual-level variations in attitudes on immigration. Conversely, and most importantly, 
the main contribution of our investigation is the finding that long-term values have more relevant effects on 
orientations towards immigration at the individual level, with significant implications for the way we interpret 
the success of the League under Salvini’s leadership riding the immigration issue. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we review the literature on classic explanations of 
attitudes towards immigrants, from which we derive specific hypotheses we empirically test later. We next 
discuss the concept of political values, and the potential role of values in accounting for attitudes towards 
immigrants, leading to specific expectations about empirical findings. We then introduce our data and the 
methodological choices we made to provide an empirical assessment of our hypotheses. Finally, we present 
empirical findings, which let us assess the effects of values and other predictors on voters’ attitudes on immi-
gration in 2018 Italy. Conclusion follows. 
 
 
2. Literature review: explaining attitudes towards immigration 
  
Attitudes towards immigration are variously explained - both in public debate and in specialized scientific 
literature - relying on different theoretical perspectives. In this section we review the most relevant contribu-
tions to this topic, leaving to the next section the discussion of our value-based original contribution to the 
literature and its relevance in the context of the Italian case.  
A recurrent narrative, both in public and academic debate, links attitudes towards migrants to economic 
insecurity of individuals. In particular, socio-economic status and, more generally, social class have been ar-
gued to affect political tolerance and, more indirectly, orientations towards immigration (Ignazi 1992; Quillian 
1995; Burns and Gimpel 2000). The theoretical underpinnings of these claims rest on the argument that the 
chances for familiarization with diversity -responsible, in turn, of a greater level of openness and tolerance- 
are profoundly based on the socio-economic resources of individuals (Sullivan, Feldman and Pierson 1981; 
Scheve and Slaughter 2001). On the one hand, higher social classes have the necessary resources to access 
higher levels of education - and education is a key variable to explain different levels of tolerance and openness. 
On the other hand -and with specific reference to immigration-, higher social classes, enjoying better material 




conditions than lower classes and being freed from economic need, feel less the economic threat potentially 
resulting from migrant inflows. Quite the contrary, lower classes, being more likely to experience difficulties 
in the labour market, perceive inflows of migrants as an economic threat: indeed, increasing levels of migration 
flows could generate a widening of the labour supply, pushing wages down and reducing employment oppor-
tunities. In other words, the weight of the economic threat would fall entirely on the most disadvantaged socio-
economic strata (Scheve and Slaughter 2001). However, more recent research has shown that, rather than 
linear, the relation between economic conditions and attitudes towards immigration is rather curvilinear, with 
relatively deprived and relatively gratified both displaying more negative attitudes compared to those laying 
in between the two extremes (Guimond and Dambrun 2002; Postmes and Smith 2009; LeBlanc, Beaton, and 
Walker 2015; Jetten, Mols and Postmes 2015). In line with this approach, negative attitudes towards immigra-
tion found among wealthier-off are to be attributed to the (somehow paradoxical) fear to loose socio-economic 
privileged positions: “the perception that one is relatively wealthy is therefore not always more comfortable 
than the perception that one is relatively deprived…Feelings of gratification might be pleasing and comfortable 
at one level, but like all delights such relative advantages might well bring latent insecurities of loss and fears 
of decline (Jetten, Mols and Postmes 2015: 20). 
The role of economic conditions has been explored not only at individual level (linking individual economic 
conditions with attitudes towards migrants), but also at the aggregate level. In this respect, Quillian (1995) first 
suggested that to analyse attitudes towards immigration we should focus not only on individual-level variables, 
but also on context-related factors, accounting for cross-country differences. In particular, the size of the im-
migrant population, along with the macro-economic conditions of the country are deemed to have an effect on 
attitudes towards immigration, because they both indicate threat and competition in the host society (Davidov 
and Meuleman 2012: 758; for other studies focusing on economic data at the aggregate level see e.g. Meuleman 
2011; Semyonov et al. 2006). 
A different perspective is provided by theories of proximity and closeness. According to this approach, 
attitudes towards immigration would not be the exclusive result of social and economic factors, but rather of 
the direct experience of migration in everyday life, as well as the relative perception of insecurity (personal 
and non-economic) deriving from the sharing of physical and social spaces. To be sure, empirical evidence 
related to the effect of proximity and contextual factors is far from being conclusive (Hainmueller and Hopkins 
2014, 236-237). On the one hand, several scholars found that the proximity and visibility of migrants in the 
places of daily life - such as in the streets, at work, in public transport, etc. – is a driver of attitudes that tend 
to be more wary and hostile towards immigration (Fetzer 2000; Enos 2013). On the other hand, there is evi-
dence that proximity increases the chances of interactions, in fact reducing negative stereotypes (Fetzer 2000, 
106-107). A broader perspective is provided by those scholars who reconnect these apparently different mech-
anisms to contextual factors. Hopkins (2010), for example, shows that individuals who live close to migrants 
develop more negative orientations towards immigration when significant and sudden demographic changes 
occur in the residential area and when the issue becomes highly salient and politicized. Focusing on the Italian 
case, these two conditions seem to be -at least partially- met. Indeed, the country has been at the forefront of 
the migrant influx in the European Union (EU)2 and the immigration issue has become highly politicized in 
the internal political arena in recent times (Vezzoni 2018; Gianfreda 2018).  
 
2 Italy is for sure one of the main countries of first arrivals for immigrants reaching Europe by the sea. In recent years migra-
tion flows have increased noticeably. For example, as reported by Castelli Gattinara (2017, 319): “Of the one million refugees 
that crossed the Mediterranean in 2015 alone, 154,000 landed in Italy, resulting in a 31 percentage-point increase in annual 
asylum application rates”. 





As argued above, and from an opposite perspective, some studies show how the sharing of everyday spaces 
and experiences actually creates the conditions for greater tolerance, encouraging the exchange of ideas, mu-
tual knowledge, and openness to diversity (Fetzer 2000; McLaren 2003). These findings nicely fit the classical 
framework of the contact hypothesis (Allport 1958; Amir 1969). According to this hypothesis, when people 
from one social group enter into personal contacts and increase their personal interactions with members of 
another group, they tend to develop more positive attitudes towards the outgroup. However, when applied to 
the case of native attitudes towards immigrants, empirical evidence is not conclusive. Some studies have con-
firmed the expectations of the contact theory, demonstrating that having friends or working with people from 
immigrant groups make negative attitudes towards immigrants less likely (Fetzer 2000; McLaren 2003; El-
lison, Shin, and Leal 2011; see also Homola and Tavits 2017). Others, instead, found null or opposite results 
(e.g. Ford 1986; Gravelle 2016). In the attempt to explain these mixed results, Homola and Tavits (2017) 
suggest that the effect of contact on attitudes towards immigration is conditional across individual ideological 
predispositions: contact reinforces positive attitudes towards immigrants among leftist people, while it pro-
duces no effect or slightly increases threat perceptions among rightist.  
Moreover, anti-immigrant attitudes have been considered to be related with not just actual (social and per-
sonal) contacts with them, but also with perceptions. In particular, perceptions concerning personal physical 
security. We trace this idea back to the notion of securitization of migration, which has strongly linked the 
discourse about immigration with public order and security (Huysmans 2006). Specifically, in Italy, both main-
stream parties and anti-establishment ones, have faced the migration crisis adhering to a logic of emergency, 
nurturing public anxieties and security concerns, and thus favouring a conflation between immigration and 
personal insecurity (Castelli Gattinara 2017, 11). In this general perspective, immigration has been often 
framed in terms of potential physical safety threats for citizens (McLaren and Johnson 2007).  
Finally, the literature has revealed effects for a number of socio-demographic conditions. As for the effect 
of gender on attitudes towards immigration, empirical evidence is far from being conclusive. While in tradi-
tional studies on tolerance women were generally identified as less tolerant than men (see e.g., Stouffer 1955; 
Nunn, Crockett, and Williams 1978), more recent studies on attitudes towards immigration among women and 
men reach different results (Facchini and Mayda 2009). Mixed evidence exists also for the effect of age on 
attitudes towards immigration. Some scholars found out that young people hold more positive attitudes towards 
immigration (Facchini and Mayda 2009); others, instead, contradict this finding (Fennelly and Federico 2008). 
On the contrary, scholars are unanimous as for the role of education on attitudes towards immigration: more 
educated individuals generally adopt more open attitudes towards immigration (Sullivan et al. 1981; Scheve 
and Slaughter 2001; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Manevska and Achterberg 2013)3. With reference to mu-
nicipal size, it has been shown that in small, rural areas, orientations towards immigration should be more 
restrictive compared to urban areas (Fennelly and Federico 2008).  
The arguments that we have briefly described reconnect attitudes towards immigration to factual conditions 
(socio-economic status; socio-demographic characteristics; proximity) or to individual perceptions deriving to 
some extent from these conditions (e.g. perceptions of personal insecurity).  
However, we claim that an even more interesting argument can be retrieved in the comparative literature. 
This looks at the effect exerted by value predispositions. On the basis of this perspective, attitudes towards 
immigration would not be so much (or only) conveyed by factual conditions of economic deprivation and 
 
3 Although Lancee and Sarrasin (2015) suggest a more complex relationship. 




proximity or by subjective perceptions of insecurity, but rather from that set of general and existential princi-
ples that guide people's opinions and social behaviour. This perspective has been comparatively less studied 
(Davidov and Meuleman 2012), especially with specific reference to the Italian case – although with some 
remarkable exceptions (e.g. Sagiv and Schwartz 1995; Pantoja 2006; Davidov et al. 2008; Catellani and Milesi 
2010; Davidov and Meuleman 2012). Notwithstanding, still there is not full agreement on the expected direc-
tion of the relations between attitudes towards immigration and values.  The adaptation and application of this 
view to the Italian case constitutes the core of our investigation. This is discussed in the next section. 
 
 
3. Values and immigration 
  
Values can be defined as abstract and relatively stable principles that regulate individual action through the 
definition of motivational goals (Schwartz 1992; 1994; 2006; Catellani and Milesi 2010). Schwartz defined 
them as “desirable transsituational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in the life of 
a person or other social entity” (Schwartz 1994: 21). As such, they are different compared to attitudes: values 
refer to general situations and are more abstract compared to attitudes, which instead apply to specific objects 
or situations (Davidov and Meuleman 2012: 760). Furthermore, values are deemed to be more durable over 
time, whereas attitudes change in different contexts and situations (Davidov and Meuleman 2012).  
Values are also considered as constitutive elements of political ideologies, the basic elements that ground a 
coherent structure of convictions concerning not only the social world as it is but also as it should be (Catellani 
and Milesi 2010). From this point of view, values are not simply a guide to individual action (what is good or 
fair to do for the individual) but, from a political perspective, also "heuristic devices" that regulate the attitudes 
of individuals towards certain policies or specific issues (what would be right for the political system to do in 
relation to certain issues) (Catellani and Milesi 2010, 221). In other words, although value predispositions are 
existential principles, they can have clear political implications. For example, in a study conducted on the 2006 
Italian National Election Study, Catellani and Milesi (2010) showed how certain values were significantly 
correlated with a right-wing ideological position, whereas other values were significantly correlated with a 
left-wing ideological position. It is exactly adopting this perspective that the question of how values relate to 
attitudes towards immigration becomes clearly relevant. To the extent that values are deemed to be at the base 
of political orientations and attitudes towards policy issues, it is then a matter of determining whether and to 
what extent value predispositions structure the ways in which people perceive migrants. Moreover, an addi-
tional perspective justifies our attention to values as explanatory factors of attitudes towards immigration. 
Conceptualizing values in terms of motivational goals, we indeed expect that individual attitudes will be af-
fected by value predispositions if the object of the attitude prevents the achievement of the more general value 
objective. In other words, we deem values able to modify individual attitudes towards immigration if immi-
gration is perceived as an obstacle to the realization of the value motivational goal (Davidov et al. 2008; Da-
vidov and Meuleman 2012). 
Probably, the most systematic attempt to identify the main values that guide human action is to be attributed 
to psychologist Shalom Schwartz (1992, 1994, 2006). In a series of studies conducted in more than 60 coun-
tries, Schwartz identified a list of ten fundamental values that people recognize as guiding principles of their 
social action and which identify as many existential objectives: Universalism (Understanding and tolerance); 
Benevolence (Improvement of the well-being of nearby people); Tradition (Respect for tradition and its herit-
age); Conformity (Respect for the rules, the established order and social norms); Security (Protection of social 
order and personal security); Achievement (Personal success and social recognition); Hedonism (Search for 





sensory pleasure); Self-direction (Autonomy and control of one's own destiny); Stimulation (Search for a life 
in continuous evolution and full of stimuli); Power (High economic and social status that gives access to the 
resources necessary to obtain a dominant position compared to others). 
These values are not disconnected with one another, but they are rather characterized by dynamic interac-
tions. In particular, they can be ordered along two general dimensions, defining the broader psychological 
structure that organizes values in terms of reciprocal compatibility. The two dimensions are bipolar and each 
of them contrasts two opposite existential objectives. In Figure 1 we report the structure of relations among 
values provided by Schwartz (1994, 221). The first dimension (Conservation-Openness to change) contrasts 
the desire for conformation to tradition and social norms (including the values of tradition, conformity, and 
security), and the desire for independence (including the values of stimulation and self-direction). The second 
dimension (Self-enhancement – Self-transcendence) reflects the opposition between the will to achieve power 
and success (including the values of power and achievement) and the will to commit for others (including the 
values of benevolence and universalism). As for the value of hedonism, it is still dubious to which of these 
four categories should be included. Some scholars found that it is closer to self-direction and achievement, 
others instead that it is closer to the values of power and achievement (Catellani and Milesi 2010). 
 
Figure 1 - Types of values 
Source: Schwartz (1994, 24). 





Once assessed the nature and the structure of relations between values, we now move to set our expectations 
on how values could affect attitudes towards immigration. In this respect, extant research is far from conclu-
sive. Indeed, only values associated with self-transcendence and conservation seem to have unambiguous ef-
fects. More controversial, instead, are findings concerning values associated with self-enhancement and open-
ness to change. Let’s thus start by fixing expectations related to values of self-transcendence and conservation, 
the ones where the literature is substantially in agreement.   
Sagiv and Schwartz (1995), starting from the basic conceptualization of values as motivational goals, argued 
that the arrival of immigrants in the host society might be perceived as an obstacle to the achievement of the 
conservation values. Indeed, immigrants bring their own traditions and norms, which are a powerful source 
for social change. In societies where multicultural instances are on the rise, it becomes much more difficult for 
conservative individuals to defend customs and values of the traditional culture (Davidov and Meuleman 
2012). People who deem these values important in their life, tend to emphasize the need for law and order and 
manifest a clear resistance to change and novelty (Leong and Ward 2006). They are also the ones who feel 
more threatened by unexpected events, ambiguous situations, and modification of traditional lifestyles. As a 
consequence, they are expected to hold more negative attitudes towards everything that might modify (or de-
viate from) traditional social norms and cultural habits (Hofstede 1979, 1980). 
  On the contrary, people who are committed for others and seek to improve the well-being of other people 
(i.e. benevolence and universalism), should be more likely to develop a positive attitude towards immigrants 
(Davidov et al. 2008; Sagiv and Schwartz 1995). These are in fact people who assign great value to tolerance 
and protection for others. For these people, the inflow of immigrants produces social changes that are in line 
with their value predisposition and that allow them to pursue their preferred motivational goals (Davidov and 
Meuleman 2012). 
More controversial is the establishment of clear expectations about the effect of values belonging to the 
broader orientations towards self-enhancement and openness to change. For values embedded in the self-en-
hancement pole, some scholars suggest that these should be correlated with negative attitudes towards immi-
gration. In this argument, based on traditional group conflict theories (e.g. Blalock 1967), political and eco-
nomic competition is key to explain negative attitudes towards out-groups: as the latter are seen as rival, neg-
ative attitudes should be greater. Thus, as the increased inflow of immigrants is perceived by those who seek 
personal power and success as an additional obstacle to the realization of their motivational goals, people who 
assign great relevance to self-enhancement values should have more negative attitudes towards immigrants 
(Duriez et al. 2002). However, out-group contact may provide members of the dominant group with opportu-
nities to gain or express power and control. If out-group members hold inferior statuses in society -as minorities 
usually do- dominant group members are able to exercise authority and to experience superiority over them” 
(Sagiv and Schwartz 1995: 440). As a consequence, for those who seek power and personal success, immi-
grants’ inflows might in fact represent an opportunity, rather than a threat to their power positions (or their 
ambitions for power). Thus, we should expect a positive correlation between self-enhancement and attitudes 
towards immigration. It is exactly because of these contradictory expectations that Sagiv and Schwartz (1995) 
expect to find no significant effect of self-enhancement on attitudes towards immigration. 
The same ambiguity applies to intellectual and affective autonomy (i.e. self-direction and stimulation). 
These are in fact typical values of those people who assign a relatively high importance to freedom and equality 
(as opposed to embeddedness in extant social norms and hierarchy), aspects that should lead -intuitively- to-
wards more positive attitudes towards diversity. Sagiv and Schwartz (1995) support this expectation, claiming 
that contact with out-group might provide occasions to express autonomy, pursuit novelty, and explore new 





and different ways of life -which are all central to self-direction and stimulation values. Furthermore, people 
who assign relevance to these values are less likely to accept stereotypes about out-groups, because they are 
more likely to express autonomous and independent evaluations based on their experience (Sagiv and Schwartz 
1995: 440; Triandis and Triandis 1972). However, and contrary to this argument, Duriez et al. (2002: pp. 43-
44) notes that the presence of out-groups might be also perceived as a threat for the realization of the values 
embedded in the broad orientation towards openness to change.     
Finally, in line with Sagiv and Schwartz 1995, no effect is expected for hedonism, as immigration is not 
expected to pose an obstacle to the achievement of sensory fulfilment and pleasure. 
Following on this discussion, we summarize in Table 1 our expectations about the relation between value 
predispositions and attitudes towards immigration: 
 
Table 1 - Values and their expected effects on attitudes towards immigration 
Broad value orientation Values Sign 
   














Hedonism Hedonism 0 
 
 
4. Data and methods 
  
In order to assess whether and to what extent the positions on immigration are the result of value predispo-
sitions, we use the data collected in a recent Computer Assisted Web-Interviewing (CAWI) opinion survey 
designed by CISE and conducted by Demetra srl in December 2018 on a representative sample of the Italian 
electoral population (N = 1,113). The main variable of interest, which will constitute the dependent variable 
in all our empirical models, is the attitude towards migrants and was measured on a scale ranging from 1 to 6, 
where 1 indicates those who believe that “Italy receives too many migrants” and 6 those who instead believe 
that “Italy could welcome more migrants”.4 The (Italian) question wording for this item was taken from the 
pre-electoral Italian National Election Study of 2018 and the same question has been already employed and 
validated by other studies (Vezzoni 2018). Moreover, we deem that such survey item reflects nicely the actual 
policy debate in the country at the time, which revolved around the ‘Porti Chiusi’ policy, separating those in 
 
4 The exact question wording and the distribution of the variable are reported in Table A4 of the Appendix. 




favor of it, desiring no more accesses (and possibly repatriations) from those opposing it (who in turn prefer 
keeping ports open to migrants).5 
To assess the predictive ability of values on immigration attitudes, measured as just outlined, we relied on 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis.6 
The respondents' value orientations were measured using a battery of ten items, one for each of the ten 
Schwartz values previously discussed. Specifically, each respondent was asked to indicate on a scale from 0 
to 4 the importance attributed to each value (0 = Value contrary to my principles, 4 = Very important value); 
the higher the value of the variable, the greater the degree of importance attributed to a specific value. The 
assessment of the effects of these variables on the abovementioned indicator of attitude towards migrants con-
stitutes the core of our empirical investigation. 
However, in order to properly assess the effects of value predispositions on attitudes towards migrants we 
also need to take into account the numerous arguments put forward by previous literature on the topic which 
we have presented in Section 2. We do so by also including additional predictors related to different strands of 
literature, as detailed below.  
Namely, we have two indicators for factual conditions of economic distress –social class and unemploy-
ment. Social class is operationalized according to the innovative classification advanced by Oesch (2006a, 
2006b) on the basis of professional placement. The class variable includes five categories: 1) Unskilled work-
ers (Low class); 2) Skilled workers (working class); 3) Small business owners (medium-low class); 4) Lower-
grade service class (medium-high class); 5) Higher-grade service class (high class). In regression models, the 
highest social class is used as a reference category. Finally, a last indicator is included to identify respondents 
unemployed at the time of the interview (a dichotomous variable with 1 = Unemployed). 
We also include a battery of items that measure the proximity to migrants in daily life, i.e. factual conditions 
of proximity according to different levels of intensity, along with perception of physical insecurity. A first 
variable measures the presence of foreign colleagues in the workplace. We deem this an indicator of personal 
contacts with immigrants. The variable is included in the model as dichotomous, with 1 indicative of the pres-
ence of foreign colleagues. A second variable measures the presence of foreigners in the streets near the re-
spondent's place of residence – social contacts. Again, the variable is operationalized as a dichotomous varia-
ble, with 1 indicative of the presence of foreigners on the street. Finally, the model includes a variable of 
perception aimed at measuring how much the respondents feel safe when they return home. The variable is 
once again operationalized as dichotomous, with 1 = Perception of insecurity. 
 
5 The item was designed to gauge respondents’ attitudes towards migrants independently from their knowledge about the ac-
tual presence of migrants in the national territory. We do not ask respondents (neither directly or indirectly) to quantify the 
number of migrants in Italy, but simply whether they prefer to have more or fewer of them. We deem that this item relaxes 
respondents from having a precise knowledge about migration flows in order to state their attitudes. 
6 We do so in order preserve interpretability of the coefficients, after having verified that the meaningful effects are corrobo-
rated by the most appropriate ordered logistic regression model. Findings employing this alternative strategy are reported in 
Table A1 of the Appendix. 





Finally, our empirical strategy features the inclusion of a battery of sociodemographic variables that measure 
gender (Reference category = Man), age cohort (Reference category = 45/54 years), educational qualification 





Before moving to empirical analysis, it is worth noting once again that value systems are considered to be 
relatively stable over time (Peffley and Hurwitz 1985, Feldman 1988, Hurwitz and Peffley 1998), so that es-
tablished predispositions in individuals tend to remain solid throughout the life cycle of people. If this is true, 
it is clear that certain attitudes, when linked to specific values, cannot be considered as an entirely new fact, 
but rather as attitudes already widespread in society and that, for various reasons, have remained latent, unex-
pressed or simply invisible. It is worth asking then if this is the case of immigration attitudes and how different 
values act on attitudes towards immigration. But before doing that, we need to corroborate our argument, by 
showing that values among Italians have remained pretty stable over time. 
 
Table 2 - The hierarchy of values in 2018 Italy 
Values Hierarchy of values  N  
    
Security 0.5  1,113 
Conformity 0.5  1,113 
Self-direction 0.4  1,113 
Hedonism 0.3  1,113 
Tradition 0.3  1,113 
Benevolence 0.2  1,113 
Universalism 0.1  1,113 
Stimulation -0.3  1,113 
Achievement -0.4  1,113 
Power -1.2  1,113 
Note: Cell entries are centred means. These should be intended as deviations from the average importance assigned to all the ten val-
ues included in the dataset. 
 
To assess the stability of value predispositions among Italian voters, we report in Table 1 the mean relevance 
of any single value for respondents of our sample. In so doing, we followed Catellani and Milesi (2010) and, 
for each respondent, we centred the importance assigned to each value to the mean relevance assigned to the 
whole set of the ten values included in our dataset. Apart from some negligible differences, our data appear in 
line with previous investigations among Italian voters (Catellani and Milesi 2010). Indeed, our data show that 
 
7 Finally, we include a categorical variable for the macro-regional area (reference category: Northern Italy), although expec-
tations from comparative literature are not clear-cut. However, we deem this control variable relevant for our models, in partic-
ular as it allows us to distinguish the regions where the electoral performance of the League has been historically more positive 
and where the party, probably, has been more able to mobilize anti-immigration positions.  




the most important values among Italian voters are security, conformity, and self-direction. These are exactly 
the same values that Catellani and Milesi found as the most relevant for Italian voters in 2010. Accordingly, 
we find that also the least relevant values among Italian voters are the same as a decade ago (namely stimula-
tion, achievement, and power). Although indirectly, this provides a further empirical confirmation of the sta-
bility over time of value predispositions, with specific reference to the Italian case, revealing that over the past 
decade the hierarchy of values among Italian voters did not change significantly. 
Let us now assess the ability of different value predispositions in driving attitudes of Italian citizens towards 
migrants. Table 3 reports evidence from the OLS regression investigation outlined in the previous section. 
We start by pointing out that the R2 in our regression, which includes all relevant predictors, is 0.25 (25% 
variance explained). Compared to an identical model not including value items,8 the model reported in Table 
3 increases predictive power by as much as 14 percentage points. In other words, compared to socio-demo-
graphic conditions, factual conditions of proximity and individual perceptions of threat, value predispositions 
weigh more than double in determining respondents’ attitudes towards immigration. This appears as an indeed 
very relevant piece of evidence in our investigation of the role of values on immigration. 
At this point we can finally look at what are the value predispositions that push towards a more or less 
positive attitude towards immigration.  
As we expected, values of the self-transcendence dimension (benevolence and universalism) play in favour 
of more positive attitudes towards immigration, as indicated by the positive and significant coefficients. This 
indicates that voters considering these values particularly important have more open attitudes towards immi-
grants. On this, our analysis confirms what Catellani and Milesi already observed in their 2010 study, where 
universalism and benevolence were identified not only as correlated with attitudes towards immigration, but 
also as variables strongly correlated with a left-wing ideological dimension. More in general, this supports the 
idea that for people who assign great value to tolerance and protection for others, the inflow of immigrants 
produces social changes that are in line with their value predisposition and allow them to pursue their preferred 
goals. 
Again, as expected, our analysis shows that, in the opposite direction, values of the conservation dimension 
 have a statistically significant negative effect on our dependent variable. However, this holds true for safety 
and tradition, while the value of conformity – controlling for everything else, including safety and tradition – 
is not a significant predictor of attitudes towards migrants. This means that those individuals who give a par-
ticularly important weight to values of security and tradition tend to have more critical attitudes towards the 
possibility of welcoming more migrants in Italy. This is substantially in line with what has been observed in 
the past by Catellani and Milesi (2010) and corroborates the classical theoretical argument that these people, 
feeling threatened by unexpected events and modification of traditional lifestyles, dislike immigration that 
might modify traditional social norms and cultural habits. 
In addition, we had a definite theory expectation for hedonism – namely that it would not yield a significant 
effect. And, once again, the evidence reported in Table 2 is in line with our expectation and previous literature. 
Coming to values of the self-enhancement and openness-to-change dimensions, we had rival theory argu-
ments supporting opposite (negative and positive) effects. Our findings show that only the openness-to-change 
value of self-direction has a significant effect. 
 
 
8 The model not including value items is reported in Table A2 of the Appendix file. In Table A3 of the Appendix we also in-
clude among the predictors, as a robustness test, the left-right self-position of respondents (measured on a conventional 
0(=Left) 10(=Right) scale. Results are fully consistent with ones presented in Table 3 of the manuscript.   





Table 3 - OLS regression: Determinants of attitudes towards immigration in 2018 Italy 
Predictors B p-value 
 
Gender (Female) 0.0713 (0.387) 
Age: 





30/44 0.0357 (0.746) 
45/54 Base 
55/64 0.0624 (0.606) 
65+ 0.194 (0.174) 
Education 0.0821* (0.036) 
Class: 
                                           High 
 
Base 
Medium-high 0.0584 (0.702) 
Medium-low -0.162 (0.322) 
Working -0.0471 (0.717) 
Lower -0.163 (0.273) 
Unemployment -0.167 (0.126) 
Zone: 
                                         North 
 
Base 
Centre 0.0285 (0.811) 
South 0.0111 (0.904) 
Municipal size -0.0337 (0.309) 
Foreign colleagues 0.312*** (0.001) 
Foreign neighbours 0.139 (0.147) 







Benevolence 0.385*** (0.000) 
Power 0.0349 (0.455) 
Achievement -0.0829 (0.133) 
Hedonism -0.0902 (0.152) 
Self-direction -0.227** (0.002) 
Stimulation 0.0613 (0.269) 
Security -0.507*** (0.000) 
Conformity 0.00960 (0.898) 
Tradition -0.253*** (0.000) 




Notes: OLS regressions; p-values in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. The dependent variable scores 1 when re-
spondents state that that Italy receives too many migrants and 6 for those who instead believe that Italy could welcome more migrants. 




Thus, positive coefficients indicate an effect in the direction favourable to immigrants, a negative coefficient and effect in the anti-immi-
grant direction. 
 
In particular, self-direction has a negative effect, which is in contradiction with what Catellani and Milesi 
observe in their study, and with the classical literature arguments stressing that contact with out-group and 
stereotypes might provide opportunity for autonomy and independence. Rather, this piece of evidence seems 
to support that the presence of out-groups is perceived as a threat for the realization of the values embedded in 
openness-to-change dimension (Duriez et al. 2002).     
Finally, as anticipated, net of everything else, self-enhancement values do not influence immigration atti-
tudes. This supports the rejection of both the classic group-conflict theoretical argument and its rival one, based 
on the opportunity represented by immigrants for people desiring power and achievement. It might very well 
be that both mechanisms are at play for different individuals, but the point is that none of the two prevails in 
statistical terms in the Italian electorate. 
To sum up, our empirical investigation shows that, even in a complex multi-variate regression model, the 
predictive power of value predispositions over immigration attitudes is clear and large. Moreover, it indicates 
that the links between value types and immigration follow the routes indicated by the literature. Thus, they are 
intelligible and can be interpreted as confirmation for relevant theoretical arguments. 
Besides the evidence pertaining values, Table 3 includes a number of elements of substantial interest, which, 
though lateral to our line of inquiry, deserves to be noted. 
In short, our findings reveal that, when including long-term value predispositions, the only predictors with 
a distinctive statistically significant effect on immigration attitudes are education (positive effect), proximity 
in the workplace (positive effect) and perception of insecurity (negative effect). On the contrary, no statistically 
significant effects emerge for age,9 gender, residence, social classes nor unemployment. 
Thus, in the Italian case, and when including value predispositions, the classic claim that conditions of 
economic insecurity of individuals are linked to anti-immigrant positions is not empirically confirmed. More-
over, no single socio-demographic indicator has an effect that overcomes the test of statistical significance. 
With one exception – education. Thus, the claim that more educated individuals generally adopt more open 
 
9 In relation to age it is worth noticing that in the models without value items we found a positive effect both among younger 
(18/29 years old) and older (+65 years old) age cohorts, when compared to the 45-54 age cohort. This pattern, although not in 
a significant way, also emerges when including value items in the models. This seems to suggest that younger and older peo-
ple might have more favorable positions towards migrants than middle-aged people. While this is not surprising for what con-
cerns young people (who are generally considered more open to external influences), more interesting is the case of older peo-
ple. There are different arguments (not tested here) that could plausibly explain this finding. A first argument looks at the role 
of socialization. The cohort aged 65 or more was in fact socialized at the end of the 60’s, in a period of radical cultural, social, 
and political transformations for the Italian society. In this respect, there is evidence showing that generations socialized in 
that environment, were in fact more liberal (in cultural terms) or more left leaning (in political terms) compared to previous 
generations (Corbetta and Ceccarini 2010). Thus, the relatively more positive attitudes towards migrants might well be the 
consequence of a cultural orientation deriving from the specific context in which such generations were socialized. Another 
possible explanation looks instead at the objective economic conditions of people of different ages. While for older people, 
retired from the job market, immigration does not represent an economic threat (quite the contrary, it could be seen as a re-
source for the sustainability of the pension system), the same does not apply to people in their working age who might per-
ceive immigration as a source for increased competitiveness (and precariousness) of the job market.      





attitudes towards immigration appear to be present, significant, and robust to the role of values. So as the 
mechanisms highlighted by the theories of proximity and closeness are.  
Finally, we shall note that our empirical evidence also indicates that individuals who feel insecure about 
their personal safety hold, net of everything else, significantly less welcoming attitudes towards migrants, 
which suggests that the frequent framing of immigration in terms of potential physical safety threats for citizens 





The results of our analysis show that the arguments taken into consideration in this study, although all to 
some extent relevant, contribute differently to explaining attitudes towards immigration. Indeed, these attitudes 
appear to be only marginally a result of socio-demographic factors, whereas it does not seem, from our data, 
that conditions of objective economic deprivation play a significant role in accounting for them. Accordingly, 
objective conditions of proximity to immigrants and subjective perceptions of threat and insecurity, although 
relevant predictors, still offer only a limited a perspective on which are the main drivers of attitudes towards 
immigration. It is in fact the value predispositions of individuals that explain the largest share of differences 
in attitudes towards immigration among Italian voters.  
As our literature review has indicated, difficulties experienced in a precarious labour market, fear of com-
petition on economic resources and jobs, and perceptions of insecurity associated with a larger presence of 
immigrants are often considered as elements of critical opinions towards immigration and tend to provide 
legitimate arguments for these positions. However, the explanatory capacity of these arguments appears to be 
clearly limited. In fact, what clearly emerges behind these factors are latent cultural elements, which have deep 
roots in the personal history of the individual and which inform a way of thinking and acting in society. In a 
nutshell, we find that the values of safety, tradition and (to a smaller extent) self-direction are associated with 
more critical attitudes towards immigration, while benevolence and universalism play in favour of more posi-
tive attitudes towards immigration. To some extent, this resonates with recent comparative research featuring 
the Italian case, which highlights the effect of universalistic concerns on solidarity practices towards refugees 
(Maggini and Fernández 2019).  
The main implication of this result is straightforward: if it is true that values are the key to understanding 
the way individuals relate to the phenomenon of immigration, then we need to take a different look at recent 
changes in public opinion and electoral behaviour that have seen a large increase (in fact a multiplication) of 
the support enjoyed by Matteo Salvini’s League. While most commentators have suggested that Salvini’s dis-
proportionate emphasis on immigration has been a driving force for his electoral success (Chiaramonte, Eman-
uele, Maggini, and Paparo 2018; Emanuele, Maggini, and Paparo 2020), we argue that our findings suggest a 
more articulated and deeper view: the emphasis on immigration might in fact be an instrument used by the 
party to give voice and visibility to specific existential values. These are those that more than others favour 
critical, if not even hostile, attitudes towards migrants – in particular, as our investigation reveals, those linked 
to the conservation dimension, such as security and tradition. Values that in turn – being (assumed to be) 
genuine, relatively deep existential principles – are unlikely to be subject to short-term fluctuations, as they 
represent more profound aspects of the individual structure of attitudes and opinions. 
Finally (in accordance with Vezzoni 2018), this leads to rejecting the possible interpretation that in the last 
years (between the migratory crisis and the strengthening of Salvini’s leadership) a genuine transformation of 




position towards immigration has taken place among Italians. In fact, the observation that anti-immigrant atti-
tudes are predicted by general value orientations suggests that these are more structural characteristics of a part 
of Italian citizens, also in line with a value configuration that throughout the Second Republic has provided a 
basis of support for the centre-right coalition and its restrictive policies towards immigration. As a result, these 
attitudes simply appear as the expression (in specific years characterized by a higher saliency of immigration, 
possibly in consequence of a smart party communication and politicization strategy by the League) of more 
general conservative attitudes and values that constitute a structural aspect of an important part of public opin-
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Table A1 – Ordered Logistic Regression: Determinants of attitudes towards immigration in 2018 Italy 
Predictors Model without value items Model with value items 
 b p-value b p-value 
     
     
Gender (Female) 0.140 (0.242) 0.0874 (0.490) 
Age:                                  18/29 0.459* (0.019) 0.450* (0.029) 
30/44 0.112 (0.504) 0.106 (0.547) 
45/54 Base Base 
55/64 0.267 (0.143) 0.155 (0.417) 
65+ 0.553** (0.007) 0.338 (0.120) 
Education 0.200*** (0.001) 0.141* (0.020) 
Class:                                  High Base Base 
Medium-high -0.197 (0.371) 0.0742 (0.745) 
Medium-low -0.170 (0.473) -0.293 (0.241) 
Working -0.0965 (0.603) -0.0290 (0.880) 
Lower -0.323 (0.135) -0.220 (0.327) 
     
     
Unemployment -0.0582 (0.730) -0.161 (0.358) 
Zone:                                 North Base Base 
Centre -0.0871 (0.621) 0.0674 (0.714) 
South 0.0640 (0.643) 0.0277 (0.846) 
Municipal size -0.0222 (0.652) -0.0692 (0.174) 
Foreign colleagues 0.488*** (0.000) 0.359* (0.011) 
Foreign neighbours 0.311* (0.031) 0.248 (0.098) 
Perception of security -1.054*** (0.000) -0.750*** (0.000) 
Universalism   0.762*** (0.000) 
Benevolence   0.634*** (0.000) 
Power   0.0630 (0.399) 
Achievement   -0.111 (0.202) 
Hedonism   -0.200* (0.038) 
Self-direction   -0.399*** (0.001) 





Stimulation   0.0618 (0.480) 
Security   -0.715*** (0.000) 
Conformity   -0.0944 (0.404) 
Tradition   -0.445*** (0.000) 
     
Cut point 1 0.897* (0.020) -1.466* (0.022) 
Cut point 2 1.529*** (0.000) -0.726 (0.254) 
Cut point 3 2.334*** (0.000) 0.204 (0.749) 
Cut point 4 3.488*** (0.000) 1.477* (0.021) 
Cut point 5 4.475*** (0.000) 2.527*** (0.000) 
     
N 1,062 1,062 
Pseudo R2 0.042 0.108 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table A2 – OLS Regression: Determinants of attitudes towards immigration in 2018 Italy 
 Model without value items 
Predictors b p-value 
   
Gender (Female) 0.118 (0.182) 
Age:                                                              18/29 0.340* (0.019) 
30/44 0.0634 (0.593) 
45/54 Base 
55/64 0.180 (0.166) 
65+ 0.370* (0.015) 
Education 0.137** (0.001) 
Class:                                                              High Base 
Medium-high -0.135 (0.413) 
Medium-low -0.143 (0.418) 
Working -0.103 (0.462) 
Lower -0.242 (0.131) 
Unemployment -0.0862 (0.465) 
Zone:                                                            North Base 
Centre -0.0369 (0.775) 
South 0.0440 (0.660) 
Municipal size -0.00721 (0.840) 
Foreign colleagues 0.404*** (0.000) 
Foreign neighbours 0.201 (0.052) 
Perception of security -0.706*** (0.000) 








* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table A3 – Robustness test (OLS Regression): Determinants of attitudes towards immigration in 2018 Italy, including left-right self-
position of respondents 
Predictors b p-value 
 
Gender (Female) 0.0484 (0.536) 
Age:                                                              18/29 0.226 (0.080) 
30/44 0.0674 (0.519) 
45/54 Base 
55/64 0.00482 (0.966) 
65+ 0.170 (0.210) 
Education 0.0613 (0.100) 
Class:                                                              High Base 
Medium-high 0.0498 (0.731) 
Medium-low -0.116 (0.455) 
Working -0.0781 (0.526) 
Lower -0.127 (0.365) 
Unemployment -0.186 (0.074) 
Zone:                                                            North Base 
Centre -0.0162 (0.886) 
South -0.0468 (0.594) 
Municipal size -0.0220 (0.483) 
Foreign colleagues 0.265** (0.003) 
Foreign neighbours 0.0834 (0.358) 
Perception of security -0.359*** (0.000) 
Left-right self-position -0.166*** (0.000) 
Universalism 0.228*** (0.000) 
Benevolence 0.312*** (0.000) 
Power 0.0407 (0.358) 
Achievement -0.0366 (0.486) 
Hedonism -0.109 (0.068) 
Self-direction -0.180** (0.010) 
Stimulation 0.0659 (0.211) 
Security -0.457*** (0.000) 
Conformity 0.0214 (0.763) 
Tradition -0.174** (0.005) 
Constant 4.281*** (0.000) 
   
N 1,059 
R2 0.332 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 





Table A4 – Frequency distribution of the Dependent Variable. Exact question wording is as follows: “Alcuni dicono che riceviamo troppi 
immigrati. Altri dicono che va bene come è adesso. Altri ancora dicono che potremmo accoglierne di più. Lei dove collocherebbe la Sua 
opinione? 1= Riceviamo troppi immigrati; 6= Potremmo accogliere più immigrati”  
  Freq. % 
    
Riceviamo troppi immigrati  1 545 48.97 
 2 153 13.75 
 3 176 15.81 
 4 143 12.85 
 5 54 4.85 
Potremmo accogliere più immigrati 6 39 3.5 
Missing values  3 0.27 
    
Total  1,113 100 
 
